Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

The State of Utah v. Shane Hochstetter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Utah State Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
G. Fred Metos; Yengich, Rich, Xaiz & Metos; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Shane Hochstetter, No. 890537 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2155

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
.A10
DOCKET MO
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ff0537*

Plaint i ff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890537-CA

SHANE HOCHSTETTER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, JUDGE
PRESIDING.

G. FRED METOS #2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
R. PAUL VAN DAM
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

FILED
DEC

81989

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890537-CA

SHANE HOCHSTETTER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, JUDGE
PRESIDING.

G. FRED METOS #2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
R. PAUL VAN DAM
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF AGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE A CAUTIONARY
JURY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
WAS NOT SUBMITTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL.

CONCLUSION

13

1

CASES CITED
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Ut. 1988)

8

Gideon v. Wainvriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

7

State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Ut. 1988)

8

State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Ut. 1986)

7

State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1986)
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989)
State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 (Ut. 1988)
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668 (1984)
United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648 (1984)

6, 8, 9, 10
8, 10
8
7, 8, 9
7

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated §76-2-405(2) (1953 as amended)

10

Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended)

2

Utah Code Annotated §76-6-506.1 (1953 as amended)

2

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah

2, 9

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

2, 7

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

SHANE HOCHSTETTER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890537-CA

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal

is made pursuant to Title 77, Part 35f

Section 26 of the Utah Code (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a) of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

This court has appellate

jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a Section
3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgement of conviction
for the offenses of Aggravated Robbery and Falsely Signing a
Financial
Judicial

Transaction
District

Card

Court,

Sales
in

and

Slip
for

entered
Salt

in

Lake

the Third

County,

the

effective

of

Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge presiding.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Was

appellant

denied

his

right

to

assistance of counsel by trial counsel's failure to request or
submit a cautionary instructon on eyewitness identification?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the of nature and cause of the
accusation;
to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Shane Hochstetter, was charged in a two
count

information with the offenses of Aggravated

Robbery, a

violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) and
Falsely

Signing

a

Financial

Transaction

Card

Sales

Slip

a

violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-506.1 (1953 as amended).
(R. 6)
27, 28)

Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial.

(R.

He was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years to

life and one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.

(R.

63,64).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At trial, Ola Brattegard testified that in the early
morning hours of May 21, 1988, he and a friend, Marie Sorieno,

were taking a walk on First Avenue in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 51)
The couple was stopped by three males whom he had never seen
before.

In court, Brattegard identified one of the males as the

appellant.

(Tr.

53)

Brattegard

testified

that

appellant

brandished a handgun and threatened to kill him unless he gave
them

all his money.

(Tr. 53, 55)

The witness originally

believed that a knife had been brandished, but then realized that
it was a small caliber handgun.

(Tr. 55)

robbers his coat and the three ran away.

Brattegard gave the
(Tr. 56)

The coat

contained Brattegard's wallet, money, telephone credit card and
bank credit card.

A Loris watch and an identification card for

Brattegard from the Norwegian army were also in the coat.

(Tr.

57)
The witness described the gunman as about six feet two
inches tall with thin long hair.

He stated that the gunman was

wearing a black leather jacket and a yellow bandanna.

(Tr. 61)

Brattegard had previously described the gunman as being five feet
nine inches tall, one hundred fifty pounds and having medium
length hair.

(Tr. 122, 125)

The robbery took place at two

o'clock in the morning on a street that had no street lights.
(Tr. 51, 61-62)
Annette Scott testified that she worked at a gift shop
at Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah.

(Tr. 68)

She identified

a credit card transaction slip made out to Ola Brattegard for the
purchase of a bracelet on the morning of May 21, 1988.

(Tr. 69)

Brattegard has previously testified that it was not his signature
on that transaction slip.

(Tr. 58)

- 3 -

The address written on the

slip was "180 P St" in Salt Lake City.

(Tr. 69)

Ms. Scott was

not able to give a description of the person who purchased the
bracelet and stated that she was not positive if she had ever
seen appellant other than in court.
Mike John
Street Pawn.

Casner

(Tr. 77)

the transaction.

(Tr. 74)

identified

a pawn

card

Mr. Casner did not specifically remember

He stated that he is required to get a picture

identification and take a thumb print on the card.
card

from Main

identified by Mr. Casner

(Tr. 77)

contained appellant's

reflected that a California identification was used.

The

name and
(Tr. 81)

The card further reflected that a gold bracelet and Loris watch
had been pawned on the afternoon of May 21, 1988.

(Tr. 75, 78)

Fifteen year old Misty Mortenson testified that she had
met appellant through some friends.

(Tr. 82)

She indicated that

in May of 1988 the appellant, Jay Cane and others were at her
residence on 180 P Street in Salt Lake City.

(Tr. 82, 84, 90)

She stated that at that time Jay Kane and appellant talked about
robbing a Norwegian army sergeant.
testified

(Tr. 85, 93)

that she was with the appellant

Speedway Cafe in Ogden, Utah.

(Tr. 96)

listen to a band called the "Pagan Babies."

Heather Smith

and others at the
They were there to
(Tr. 98)

She stated

that during the evening appellant and others talked about having
robbed a Norwegian army sergeant.

(Tr. 96)

A wrist watch that

was supposed to have been taken in the robbery was passed around.
(Tr. 98)
1988.

Ms. Smith initially indicated this occured in June,

(Tr. 96)

She later stated that she could not recall if

the conversation occured before or after May 21, 1988.

(Tr. 99)

Ms. Smith also testified that a friend named David has called her
on a stolen telephone credit card.

(Tr. 97)

A crime laboratory technician, Steven Rowley, testified
that appellant's thumbprint was on the pawn shop card.

(Tr. 107)

He also testified that the same person who filled out appellant's
application for a California driver's license wrote the phrase
"180 P" on the credit card slip from the gift shop at Fashion
Place Mall.

(Tr. Ill)

He testified that the two documents had

thirteen common letters.

(Tr. 114)

Sargeant Rowley stated

"I

determined that approximately 10 to 12 of those [letters] were
written almost the same."
Appellant

(Tr. 114)

testified

in his own behalf.

participating in the robbery.
had

pawned

a bracelet

and

(Tr. 133)
a watch.

He denied

He did admit that he
(Tr. 134)

testified that the items were pawned to buy gas.

Appellant

He received the

bracelet from an individual named Jay Kane and the watch from an
individual named Eric.

(Tr. 134)

Appellant testified that he

was with Heather Smith at a "Pagan Babies" performance on May 17,
1988.

(Tr. 132)

Appellant denied that he had written "180 P" on

the credit card slip.

(Tr. 137)

He also testified that his

mother had done most of the writing on his driver's license
application.

(Tr. 145)

Appellant further denied that he had

made statements about the robbery to either Heather Smith or
Misty Mortenson.

(Tr. 143-144)

Appellant testified that he was

present when Jay Kane and two other males named Eric and Brook
talked

to

sergeant.

Misty

Mortenson

(Tr. 131)

about

robbing

a

Norwegian

army

Trial counsel for appellant did not submit any jury
instructions.
desired

The trial court asked counsel, sua sponte, if he

an eyewitness

identification

instruction,

(Tr. 154)

Counsel responded, "I have no objection to going without it."
The

court

then

responded "No.11

n

askedf

You do not want

(Tr. 155)

one?"

and counsel

With respect to the robbery count,

trial counsel raised an identification defense.
statement, he discussed discrepancies between

In his opening
the appellant's

physical appearance and Brattegard's initial description of the
gunman.

(Tr. 188-119)

In closing, counsel also argued the

problems with the eyewitness identification.

(Tr. 169-170)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

failure

to

submit

eyewitness identification
trial

counsel

professional

which

judgment.

a cautionary

instruction

on

constituted deficient performance by

was

not

an

There

was

exercise
no

of

reasonable

conceivable

advantage in refusing to request the instruction.

tactical

Further, the

failure to request the instruction was prejudicial to appellant's
case because there was a reasonable probability that the result
would have been different had that instruction been given.

The instruction that the trial court referred to was not made
part of the record. However, it is fairly obvious that the court
was inquiring about the preferred instruction described in State
v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1986), that instruction is attached in
the Addendum.
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ARGUMENT
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE A CAUTIONARY
JURY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
WAS NOT SUBMITTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as applied to the States guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to counsel.

Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

In

Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S 668 (1984), the Court held that
the

Sixth

effective

Amendment

also

assistance

of

entitled

counsel.

criminal
In

that

defendants

case,

to

the Court

established a two prong test to determine if a defendant has been
denied that right.

First, there must be a showing that counsel's

performance was deficient.
prejudice.
counsel's

Second, there must be a showing of

The deficiency in performance cannot be presumed from
inexperience,

a

lack

complexity of the proceeding.
648 (1984).

of

time

to prepare,

or the

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

Under the ruling in Strickland, prejudice is shown

if the result of

the trial probably would have been different.

This must be based on a review of all the evidence.

The Court

noted that the ultimate focus must be on the fundamental fairness
of the proceeding.
All of the recent decisions addressing the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel from this court and the Supreme
Court of Utah have applied the Strickland test.
the

requirement

of

the

showing

of

a deficient

specific acts or ommissions must be alleged.
showing

that

such

acts

professional judgment.

were

not

With respect to

the

result

performance,

There must be a
of

reasonable

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Ut. 1986).
- 7 -

If a lawyer exercises judgement in his choice of trial strategy
or tactics that does not produce a favorable result there is not
necessarily ineffective assistance of counsel.
766 P.2d 1062 (Ut. 1988).

State v. Colonna,

In Colonna, the court indicated that

deference will be given to counsel's trial decisions.
went on to state,
held

The court

"Generally, an attorney's performance will be

ineffective only when there is no tactical or strategic

justification for his conduct at the trial"

766 P.2d at 1066.

In State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989)
this

court

discussed

the

function

of

an

appellate

court

in

addressing the prejudice requirement of the Strickland standard.
The court stated:
We must...determine if counsel's deficient
performance undermines our confidence in the
verdict against the defendant.
[citation
ommitted] Specifically, we must decide if a
reasonable probability exists that the jury's
verdict would have been more favorable to
defendant...
771 P.2d at 692.
of

prejudice

The reviewing court may first assess the issue

in

disposing

of

ineffective

counsel

claims.

Strickland v. Washington, supra: Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803
(Ut. 1988)
In this case the specific act constituting ineffective
assistance of counsel relates to the failure to have the jury
given
Before

a

cautionary
an

instruction

ineffective

counsel

on

eyewitness

claim

may

identification.

succeed

on

a jury

instruction issue, the appellant must show that he was entitled
to the instruction.

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Ut. 1988).

In

State v. Long, supra, the court found prejudicial error in the

- 8 -

refusal

to

give

a

cautionary

eyewitnesses identification.
detail

the

evidence.

serious

problems

instruction

on

the

issue

of

In that case the court discussed in
with

eyewitnesses

identification

The court rejected a corroboration requirement as a

solution to the problems with eyewitness identification.

The

court then stated:
...we do consider ourselves compelled by the
overwhelming weight of the empirical research
to take steps to alleviate the difficulties
inherent
in
any
use
of
eyewitness
identification testimony.
We are convinced that, at a minimum,
additional judicial guidance to the jury in
evaluating such testimony is warranted. We
therefore today abandon our discretionary
approach to cautionary jury instructions and
direct that in cases tried from this date
forward, trial courts shall give such an
instruction
whenever
eyewitness
identification is a central issue in a case
and such an instruction is requested by the
defense. Given the great weight jurors are
likely to give eyewitness testimony, and the
deep and generally unperceived flaws in it,
to convict a defendant on such evidence
without advising the jury of the factors that
should be considered in evaluating it could
well deny the defendant due process of law
under article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.
721 P.2d at 490.
case

would

instruction.

have

If properly requested, the trial court in this
been

required

to

give

this

cautionary

In fact, the trial court suggested to counsel that

such an instruction be given.

(Tr. 154)

With respect to the first prong of the Strickland test,
trial counsel's rejection of the eyewitness instruction clearly
constituted a deficient performance that fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment.
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In this regard,

this case is very similar to the situation in State v. Moritzsky,
supra.

In Moritzsky,

aggravated assault.

the defendant

had

been

convicted

He had claimed defense of habitation.

evidence was in conflict.

of
The

However, the defendant's testimony

indicated that the victim had come into his residence before
defendant shot at him.

The jury instruction submitted by defense

counsel failed to incorporate a presumption that the defendant
acted

reasonably

if

the

victim's

entry

was

made

under

circumstances specified in Utah Code Annotated §76-2-405(2) (1953
as amended).

The court in Moritzsky found that the defendant

would have been entitled to have the jury

instructed on the

presumption if it had been properly requested.

The court held

that there was no conceivable tactical basis for requesting a
defense of habitation instruction without the presumption.

The

conviction in Moritzsky was reversed and a new trial ordered.
In the instant
robbery

charge was

identification

of

that

case, the defense to the aggravated
Ola

appellant.
o

State v. Long, supra,

Brattegard

the

situation,

surrounding

the

in his

The suggested

instruction from

details the various

factors that may

affect an eyewitness identification.
were present here:

was mistaken

Several of those factors

the lighting, the time of day, the stress of
prior

identifications,

identification

and

the

circumstances

discrepancies

description of appellant and the robber.

in

the

The purpose of this

instruction is to alleviate the problems inherent in eyewitness
2
The instruction is reproduced in its entirety in the
Addendum.
- 10 -

identification
conceivable

evidence.

tactical

Consequently,

advantage

in

not

there

can

requesting

be

no

such

an

instruction.
The final issue to be addressed is that of prejudice.
If

this

case

was

based

soley

on

eyewitness

identification

evidence, there would be no question as to the prejudice in
failing

to give the cautionary

instruction.

State v. Long,

supra.

In addition to the eyewitness identification evidence

there was evidence that the appellant made statements about the
robbery.

The state also

introduced opinion evidence on the

handwriting analysis of the credit card slip and the documents
from the pawn shop.

However, appellant did testify and deny

that he had committed the robbery.

He also testified that he did

not make the statements, nor did he use the victim's credit card
on the day following the robbery.

Thus the credibility of this

additional evidence was put at issue.
There were serious problems with the credibility of
Misty Mortenson and Heather Smith.

Misty Mortenson testified

that both appellant and Jay Kane were talking about the robbery.
She was unable to describe who said what in the conversation.
(Tr. 92)

Appellant

testified

that he was present when the

conversation took place, but it was Jay Kane and two others who
discussed committing

the robbery.

(Tr. 1331)

Heather Smith

described talking to appellant

about the robbery at a "Pagan

Babies" performance.

She also testified that she and

(Tr. 98)

others saw the watch taken from the Norwegian sergeant at the
time of the

robbery.

(Tr. 97)
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She did not

know

if that

conversation took place before or after May 21f 1988.

Appellant

testified that he attended the "Pagan Babies" performance on May
17, 1988.

(Tr. 132)

Smith's testimony was inconsistent with the

documentary evidence from the pawn shop indicating that the watch
was pawned at 2:30 p.m. on the day following the robbery.
76)

(Tr.

Finally, appellant testified that the two women were willing

to implicate him

in the robbery to protect

their boyfriends.

(Tr. 144)
With respect to the handwriting evidence, Steven Rowley
testified that he compared the writing on the credit card slip
and the writing on appellant's driver's license application.

His

opinion was that the person who wrote "180 P" on the credit card
slip also filled out the driver's license application.
112)

(Tr. 111-

This was based on ten to twelve letters that were written

almost the same.

(Tr. 114)

Appellant testified that he did not

fill out the credit card slip, nor did he fill out the majority
of

the

driver's

license

application.

(Tr.

135-136)

Interestingly, there was no comparison of the handwriting on the
credit card slip and the pawn slip.
the watch and bracelet.

(Tr. 134)

Appellant admitted pawning
Appellant testified that he

received the watch from Jay Kane and the gold bracelet from an
individual named Eric.

(Tr. 134)

Eric was one of the people who

was present at Misty Mortenson's residence when the robbery was
discussed.

(Tr. 131)
As

credibility

can

be

of the

seen,

serious

evidence had

issues

relating

to

the

to be decided by the jury.

Because of these credibility problems the evidence other than the

eyewitness identification was of questionable reliability.
the eyewitness evidence

would be left to stand on

Thus,

its own.

Consequently, there is a reasonable probability that the result
of

the

trial

would

have

been

different

had

the

requested

instruction on eyewitness identification been given.

CONCLUSION
Trial counsel's failure to allow the court to give a
cautionary instruction to the jury on eyewitness identification
constituted a deficient performance.

The failure to give that

instruction was prejudicial to appellant's case.
conviction

should

be

reversed

and

the case

Appellant's

remanded

to the

district court for a new trial.
DATED this

day of December, 1989.
G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
1989,

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

day of December,
the

foregoing

was

MAILED/DELIVERED to the Utah State Attorney General's office, at
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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ADDENDUM

The proposed jury instruction from State v. Long,
supra:
One of the most important questions [The only important question]
in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person
who committed the crime.
The prosecution has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was
committed but also that the defendant was the person who
committed the crime.
Ifr after considering the evidience you
have heard from both sides, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed
the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
The
identification
testimony that you have heard was an
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the
defendant
not
guilty,
you
need
not
believe
that
the
identification witness was insincere, but merely that [the
witness] was mistaken in his [her] belief or impression.
Many
factors affect
the accuracy of
identification.
In
considering
whether
the prosecution
has
proved
beyond
a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed
the crime, you should consider the following:
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the
criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time the witness observed the actor;
b) the distance between the witness and the actor;
c)
the extent to which the actor's features were visible and
undistinguished;
d)
the light or lack of light at the place and time of
observation;
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting noises or activity
during the observation;
f) any other circumstances affecting the witnesses' opportunity
to observe the person committing the crime;
2)
Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person
committing the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether the
witness' capacity was impaired by:
a) stress or fright at the time of observation;
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices;
c) uncorrected visual defects;
d) fatigue or injury;
e) drugs or alcohol;
[You should also consider whether the witness is of a different
race than the criminal actor.
Identification by a person of a
different race may be less reliable than identification by a
person of the same race.]
3)
Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal
actor at the time of the crime?

In answering this question, you should consider whether the
witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time he
[she] observed the actor.
Even if the witness had adequate
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he [she]
may not have done so unless he [she] was aware that a crime was
being committed.
4) Was the witness' identification of the defendant completely
the product of his [her] own memory?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time that passed between the witness' original
observation and his [her] identification of the defendant;
b)
the witnesss' [mental] capacity and state of mind and the
time of the identifications;
c)
the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or
identifications given by other witness, to photographs or
newspaper accounts, or to any other information or influence that
may have affected the independence of his [her] identification;
d)
any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the
crime, failed to identify the defendant;
e)
any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the
crime, gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with
the defendant's appearance;
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to
the witness for identification.
[You may take into account that an identification made by
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is
generally more reliable than an identification made from the
defendant being presented to the witness.]
[You may also take in to account that identifications made from
seeing
the
person
are
generally
more
reliable
that
identifications made from a photograph.]
Again I emphasize that the burden of proving that the defendant
is the person who committed the crime is on the prosecution. If,
after considering the evidence you have heard from the
prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluting the
eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above,
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the
person who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty.
771 P.2d at 494-495 fn. 8.

